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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FEDERALISM:
WHAT IS THE REACH OF REGULATION?
DIANE P. WOOD*
When many of us think about international law, our first
impulse might be to imagine a theoretical body of precepts and
propositions, honored only in the breach, that has little to do
with "the real world." Visions of musty rooms, earnest
professors, and tomes written in French may also come to
mind. My personal view is that there is much more to
traditional public international law than this unfavorable
stereotype suggests, but that is not what I would like to discuss
in this paper. Instead, my topic is one of more pressing
importance: at what level of government will antitrust law
reside from this point forward? This formulation may take a
few liberties with the topic of this panel, which concerns
international law and federalism and asks what the reach of
regulation is, but the only sense I could make of the first part of
the topic- international law and federalism-was to interpret it
as a question about the international equivalent of our internal
federalism debate: namely, should antitrust regulation
(whatever that may mean) occur at the national level or at some
"higher" level, either regional or global? This question about
the reach of regulation could be either positive or normative: it
could ask how far, beyond any one country's physical territory,
economic regulation can reach as a practical matter, or it could
ask about the optimal degree of so-called extraterritoriality. I
will focus on the second of these two possibilities, and I hope to
show how the answer to that question helps to answer the first
one.
.Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, and Senior Lecturer in Law,
The University of Chicago Law School. This essay is a revised version of oral remarks
presented at the Federalist Society Eighteenth Annual Student Symposium at The
University of Chicago Law School on April 9-10,1999.
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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FEDERALISM
With the exception of the period immediately following
World War II, when the leading Western nations created a new
world economic order that eventually included the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, there has never been a
time when "world" antitrust law-or competition law, as
almost every other country in the world calls this field-was
more actively on the table as a serious topic of negotiation. In
the late 1940s, the drafters of the unsuccessful Havana Charter
included "restrictive business practices" as one of the areas that
would fall under the jurisdiction of the proposed International
Trade Organization ("ITO").' But, in no small part because of
opposition that developed within the United States, the
Havana Charter never went into effect, we never had an ITO,
and the chance for world competition law was lost.
The drafters of the Havana Charter thought it only logical to
include rules about restrictive business practices in their master
document.2 In part, undoubtedly, this was for political reasons.
People had not forgotten the power of the pre-war German
cartels, or the role they played in supporting the Nazi empire.3
In part, these rules reflected the broader American effort to
export laws and secure democracy in the face of the growing
threat from the Cold War.4 There were also economic reasons,
or so the drafters would have argued. Thanks to the trade
agreements reached in 1947, the ruinously high tariffs of the
Smoot-Hawley era started to come down appreciably.5 The
hope was that this agreement would assure better access to
1. See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, at 86-91, U.N. Doc.
E/C.2/78 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., CORWIN D. EDWARDS ET AL, A CARTEL POLICY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
(1945) (reviewing the cartel problem and arguing for an international policy against
them).
4. For example, President Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, stated that
"[a] world in economic chaos would be forever a breeding ground for trouble and
war." JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR,
1941-1947 18 (1972) (quoting 2 CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1681
(1948)).
5. The Smoot-Hawley tariff bill of 1930 provoked the United States' major trading
partners into imposing retaliatory tariffs. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GAIT (1969).
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foreign markets for the exporters of each GATT signatory. But
that promise of access would be empty if restrictive, private
anticompetitive practices reared up and continued to prevent
foreign penetration of markets, or if foreign capital could not
flow readily from one country to another. For that reason, the
Havana Charter included rules on investment and on
competition.6 I will have more to say about this alleged
"market access" rationale for international competition rules,
but for now it is enough to note that the idea has been around
since the late 1940s.
Another idea also lay behind the proposed globalization of
antitrust rules, and it was one that referred back to the genesis
of American law in this field. It was appealingly simple: to the
extent that business practices occur at a global level, the rules
that regulate them must be imposed and enforced at the same
global level. In other words, if there is an international cartel in
aluminum, oil, ocean shipping, or lead, national regulators will
be unable to take effective steps to stop it, at least without
engaging in the kinds of extraterritorial regulation that raises
everyone's hackles. Only one country had either the inclination
or the ability to get away with that. The United States, people
claimed, saw the same thing in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, when the big trusts were able to move around from
state to state and evade the efforts of state authorities to
prevent their abusive practices. Standard Oil is the classic
example of this tactic, but other trusts were doing the same
thing.7 Only when regulatory power shifted "up" to the level of
the national market, with the passage of the Sherman Act8 in
1890, did antitrust law gain some bite for the new economic
environment.
But we all know that emulation is the sincerest form of
flattery. Perhaps we should have been worried that there was
hardly a stampede from the rest of the world in the wake of the
Sherman Act to copy our example. True, the Canadians beat us
by one year in passing the first version of their own
6. See Havana Charter, supra note 1, at 86-91.
7. See generally WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND EcoNoMic PoLIcY IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUSr Acr (1965).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
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competition law in 1889,9 but they would now be the first to
admit that the 1889 law was more notable for what it did not
accomplish than for what it did. English law concerning
monopolies and restrictive practices had become almost
defunct by this time. Not until after World War II was there a
real glimmer of interest in antitrust from its natural
constituents: other market-oriented, developed Western
countries. Interestingly, the first sign of change came not in
national law but in an international instrument: the European
Coal and Steel Treaty, which entered into force on July 25, 1952,
with France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and
Luxembourg as its signatories.10 Articles 65 and 66 of that
treaty respectively prohibited anticompetitive agreements and
abuses of a dominant position in the coal and steel sector." The
language of those articles, with only slight changes-except
with respect to mergers -reappears and has become more
familiar as Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, which
established the European Common Market. 2 Now, we usually
refer to this coalition as the European Union ("EU"), although
purists maintain that the Economic Community is not a
synonym for the Union.'3 Another important change is that the
Union has expanded to fifteen Member States. But the reasons
why these competition articles appeared in both treaties, and
9. See Combines Investigation Act, R.S., ch. 314. In 1986, the Combines Investigation
Act was replaced by the Competition Act of 1986, S.C., ch. 26 (1986) (Can.), which has
put Canada in the forefront of jurisdictions with strong competition rules. See also
Calvin S. Goldman, Q.C. & John D. Bodrug, Antitrust Law and Innovation: Limits on Joint
Research & Development and Inter-Company Communication in Canada, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
127 (1995) (discussing the contours of Canadian antitrust law).
10. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 298
U.N.T.S. 140.
11. Id. at arts. 65-66.
12 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958, arts.
85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340), almost all the Treaty articles have been renumbered.
Article 85 is now Article 81, and Article 86 is now Article 82. The "Consolidated"
version of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community is also codified
at O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
13. Since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992), (hereinafter "Maastricht Treaty"), there have been three "pillars" that
make up the Union: the first concerns economic union and carries forward the treaty
provisions for the old European Economic Community or Common Market; the second
concerns a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V, Maastricht Treaty); and the
third concerns Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Title VI,
Maastricht Treaty).
[Vol. 23
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why competition law has been such an important part of EU
law from the beginning, merit consideration.
Some people thought that these agreements signaled the first
steps toward a United States of Europe. Naturally, for this type
of deep political and economic integration, the transition
would require a European-level set of rules for private
economic behavior (including competition). The United States
was certainly a cheerleader, if not more, for this way of
thinking.14 The most commonly articulated reason for the
inclusion of competition rules in the European treaties
paralleled the rationale advanced for the Havana Charter:
because the Community would dismantle all trade barriers
between Member States, it had to make sure that private
restraints would not remain and thwart the treaty's goal of
market-integration. 15 Some people also argued that cartels and
"dominant firms" were also inefficient, and admittedly, that
rationale for the competition rules has grown in prominence
and importance over the years.16
To make sure their Common Market worked, the Europeans
also ceded significant national powers to the Community
institutions. They created a court, the European Court of Justice
("ECJ"), with the final say over matters of Community law.'7
Included within the treaties, as interpreted by the ECJ, was the
equivalent of a supremacy clause, under which national laws
inconsistent with Community law had to give way. 8
Furthermore, they provided a way for Community legislation,
passed by either the Council or the Commission, to have
"direct effect" on citizens of the Member States without the
need for mediating legislation at the national level.' 9 Finally,
14. Recall that General MacArthur had just "given" U.S.-style antitrust laws to the
Japanese and that the Americans were "encouraging" the Germans to take much the
same step.
15. See, e.g., CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 105 (1949).
16. See generally JACKSON, supra note 5.
17. See generally L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1994) (describing the history, development, and
practice of the ECJ).
18. The supremacy of European Community law has been asserted consistently by
the European Court of Justice. See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585
(holding that in any area where the Community has acted, Member States may not act
inconsistently with that position).
19. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
No. 11
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they granted powerful direct enforcement tools to the
Commission, which in the antitrust field can conduct "dawn
raids" on companies, demand production of evidence, impose
hefty fines, and otherwise ensure that the law is followed. 20 I
mention all this because today there is a common assumption
among many that the need for, and success of, European
competition law provides support for the contention that the
world community should create world competition rules
within the WTO. While the latter is an issue that reasonable
people can debate, they should do so without any illusions that
anything like the European system would enforce such rules.
We must ask whether it is possible to separate the structural
aspects of European competition law from its content.
While the Europeans were perfecting their supranational
system of competition law, other countries around the world
were busy passing their own national laws in this area or in
some instances-like the Canadian example I already
mentioned- substantially revising and strengthening existing
laws.21 Today, out of some 130 members of the WTO,
approximately 80 countries have a competition law.22 If we see
the glass as half empty instead of half full, we might respond
that 80 is still less than half of the 185 member countries of the
United Nations and not quite two-thirds of the WTO's
membership. Still, especially if we consider the economic
weight of those countries with competition laws in comparison
to those without, an overwhelming volume of world commerce
now occurs against a backdrop of either enforced domestic
antitrust law or domestic antitrust law that is on the books.
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (ruling that Treaty provisions could have direct effect and
that individuals could invoke them before national courts). See also Eric F. Hinton,
Strengthening the Effectiveness of Community Law: Direct Effect, Article 5 EC, and the
European Court ofJustice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307 (1999).
20. See Council Regulation 62/204 of 21 February 1962 First Regulation
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1959-62 0.J. SPEC. ED. 86. See generally
LENNARTRITrER ET AL, EEC COMPETITION LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (1991).
21. See THOMAS H. REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT
SOURCES OF CODES AND BASIC LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTION OF THE WORLD (1991)
(listing and summarizing major national antitrust and trade regulation (unfair
competition) laws).
22. The number is vague because it depends somewhat on how the term
"competition law" is defined. The great majority of those 80 laws, however, address
subjects like cartels, monopolies, and mergers, and thus are recognizable to anyone as
members of the antitrust family.
[Vol. 23102
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In the meantime, just as in Europe, the hopes of the original
GATT drafters have largely been realized. Tariffs, and even
more importantly, nontariff barriers to trade, have plummeted,
beginning with the Kennedy Round of multilateral
negotiations, accelerating through the Tokyo Round, and
finally reaching very ambitious levels in the Uruguay Round.23
In January 1995, the ITO, renamed the WTO, became the
institutional home of the world trading system. The ink was
hardly dry on the Uruguay Round agreements and the WTO
charter, however, when people began looking to the next
frontier. Apparently, it was not enough to implement an
ambitious agenda such as devising a more rational approach to
the international trade in agriculture, services, government
procurement, and other "easy" issues. Instead, three other
subjects emerged to dominate the discussion: the environment,
workers' rights, and competition.
I have not followed the first two topics closely, but I can
attest that competition certainly has staying power. About two
years ago, the WTO authorized the formation of a working
group to study the desirability of multilateral competition
rules. Chaired by Frederic Jenny,24 the working group enjoyed
strong support from the European Union, which issued a
formal paper calling for multilateral competition rules (a pet
project of former EC Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan).25 The
subject will come up again at the WTO's ministerial meetings
in Seattle near the end of this year, and the Europeans are
expected to push for the formation of a negotiating group.
They, at least, have answered the question implicit in the title
"international law and federalism" in favor of an international
version of competition regulation at the federal level. They
point to the factors I mentioned previously-the experience of
the United States in the nineteenth century, their own
23. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 13.
24. Frederic Jenny is also the vice-chairman of the French Conseil de la Concurrence
(Competition Council), chair of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development's Committee on Competition Law and Policy, and a American-educated
economist.
25. See Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules, COM(96)296
final (June 18,1996) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg4/tracompl.htm>.
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experience as they developed as perfect a common market as
they could achieve, and the indisputable fact that international
economic activity is everywhere-and urge that these factors
mean that international rules are essential for competition
law.26 It is simply illogical, they argue, to leave antitrust law
"down" at the national level, where it is doomed to be
ineffective.27
I take issue with that view. I do so both for reasons that
might be dismissed as "merely" practical and for other reasons
that are more principled. I will highlight some thoughts from
each set of concerns with the hope of providing a basis for
further discussion.
A. Practical Reasons for Keeping Competition Rules out of the WTO
First, significant definitional problems would plague any
attempt to internationalize "competition" or "antitrust" law, as
those terms mean different things to different people. They
have even meant different things to us in the United States at
different times over the last 110 years. Which version would we
be agreeing to at the WTO level? Would broad, fuzzy
principles that could finesse these definitional differences force
us to abide by regulations that we believe to be antithetical to
free market principles?
Second, the laws of most countries do not follow U.S.
antitrust law but instead emulate the European model of
competition law. The European approach, not surprisingly,
prevails in the EU as a whole-in almost all of the fifteen
Member States and in every other European country that
aspires to become a full-fledged member of the EU. In fact, part
of the price of admission to the EU is the acceptance of the
acquis communitaire for competition law. In many ways, the
European model is fine, especially as it has been used to assist
market integration in the Community,28 but it is far more
regulatory than the U.S. version of antitrust, especially when it
26. See generally Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust,
1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277 (1992) (discussing this point in greater depth).
27. See generally Joel Davidow, The Seeking of a World Competition Code: Quixotic
Quest?, in COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 361 (Oscar Schachter & Robert
Hellawell eds., 1981).
28. See Wood, supra note 26, at 290-93.
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comes to single firm conduct.29
Third, the most important element in the political agenda
behind world competition rules is a desire to assure "market
access" to each country's internal market for foreign firms.
Consider, however, the variety of practices that private firms,
undeterred by any form of government regulation, might
engage in that would effectively deny market access. They
would include vertical restraints: exclusive dealing
arrangements, tying arrangements, customer restrictions, and
the like. The Kodak-Fuji dispute over access to the Japanese
market is an excellent example. 30 I will agree, for the sake of
argument, that any rule designed to force Fuji to open its
distribution channels to Kodak might improve Kodak's access
to the Japanese market. I will not agree, however, that such a
rule necessarily would be consistent with the present state of
U.S. antitrust law concerning vertical restraints. Under U.S.
law, non-price restraints are condemned only if the firms using
them have significant power in a relevant market. The
efficiency-enhancing possibilities of many vertical restraints are
recognized by the courts.3 ' It is possible that U.S. law might
have adopted an ill-considered rule for that area, and thus
mere inconsistency may not be a reason to reject change. On
the other hand, if one thinks, as I do, that the Colgate rule32
basically gets it right, then one should be worried about a
strong market access rule that would require domestic firms to
deal with foreign firms on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Finally, monitoring systems for international competition
rules will be difficult, if not impossible, to create. Most people
who propose such rules now advocate broad principles that
29. See id.
30. See Report of the Panel, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (rejecting U.S. claims that Fuji, in league
with Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, engaged in anticompetitive
practices limiting access of Kodak film and print paper to the Japanese market).
31. See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); Business Elecs. Corp.
v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,
465 U.S. 752 (1984); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656 (7th
Cir. 1987).
32 See generally Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Refusals to Deal as Violations of the
Federal Antitrust Laws (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1. 2, 13), 41 A.L.R. FED. 175 (1979) ("Under the
Colgate rule a trader is not guilty of a Sherman Act violation if he merely suggests
resale prices and declines further dealings with all who fail to observe "them....").
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will set criteria that all WTO members must meet- something
along the lines of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property ("TRIPs") agreement.33 They also note that the United
States, Canada, Europe (both the EU and individual European
countries), Japan, Australia, Mexico, and many other countries
already have laws on the books that meet any rules that would
be negotiated. The real problem has been ensuring that rules on
paper are enforced in practice. How will the WTO do that?
Suppose, for example, that a third country takes issue with the
settlement Intel reportedly reached with the Federal Trade
Commission (a settlement about which I know virtually
nothing and about which I am not expressing a substantive
opinion). By many definitions, Intel has significant market
power. How would a WTO panel decide whether the FTC
should have accepted the settlement? Are we willing to give
the WTO subpoena power, or will it supervise antitrust cases
on the basis of some kind of agreed record? Who would be
authorized to agree to the record? No one has offered
satisfactory answers to these questions, and that is reason
enough at this stage to reject the idea of negotiating a
framework for competition policy within the WTO.
B. Theoretical Reasons for Keeping Competition Rules out of the
WTO
The following objections to the internationalization of
competition law are theoretical in nature. They assume, for the
sake of argument, that everyone is willing to agree on sound
principles of competition law, that ideas of market access and
internationalizing the Robinson-Patman Act are abandoned,
and that some answer to the monitoring problem can be
reached.34 Even in this perfect world, do we need or want
international competition regulation?
33. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULS OF THE URUGAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994).
34. That answer might be to forego monitoring, except to the extent that each
country's laws could be reviewed for adequacy under the WTO's standards. This form
of monitoring would be of little consequence concerning core antitrust laws, but it
could help significantly if we broaden the inquiry to include the competitive
consequences of different regulatory regimes.
[Vol. 23
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First, the burden of proof should lie with those who advocate
international rules for the same reasons that the need for
federal versus state regulation in the United States must be
justified and the same reasons expressed in the European
doctrine of subsidiarity.35 That is, if the job can be done at a
more democratically accountable level, a level that is better able
to fine-tune the system to local needs and easier to change as
new learning occurs, it should be done at that level.'
Second, it is not enough to emphasize that commerce is
international to make the case for international competition
rules. We do not have international taxation rules, international
rules governing securities exchanges, or international labor
codes.36 Given that the ratio of trade to GDP world-wide is
somewhere near 25 percent, the question should be how best to
devise a system that will respond to that 25 percent, or 33
percent, or 50 percent, assuming continued substantial growth
as well as the balance of domestic economic activity.
International rules provide one option, but coordinated
enforcement of domestic law is another possibility. Such
coordination is what we do with most areas of criminal law as
well as securities law.37 The burden is on those who argue for
the internationalization of competition rules to show why
coordinated enforcement of domestic laws would not work in
the context of competition law.
Third, the externalities created by differences in competition
laws around the world may not be serious enough to warrant
the internationalization of the law in this field. Do state-
tolerated export cartels inflict such significant economic
damage on countries receiving those goods that they could not
address the damage under their own antitrust laws sufficiently
35. "Subsidiarity" refers to the principle that all regulation should take place at the
most local levels of government, unless there is a justification for doing otherwise. See
Diane P. Wood, 1996 Kormendy Lecture Series: Regulation in the Single Global Market:
From Anarchy to World Federalism?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 297,305 (1996).
36. At least not at the moment, that is. Labor codes constitute another area of
potential WTO interest.
37. For example, this kind of cooperation is often needed in criminal law
enforcement activities related to organized crime and the drug trade. See Frank S. Shyn,
Internationalization of the Commodities Market: Convergence of Regulatory Activity, 9 AM. U.
J. INTL L. & POL'Y 597 (1994) (discussing international coordination in the securities
industry); see also Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money Laundering: An International
Challenge, 3 TUL J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161 (1995).
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to protect their own consumers? Is there really a problem with
unfair treatment in the enforcement of antitrust laws-that is,
would United States authorities treat a merger between two
United States companies differently from a merger between a
Brazilian company and a United States company? Answers to
such questions are needed before any massive efforts at
internationalization begin.
Finally, are antitrust laws really being used as cynical tools of
national industrial policy rather than as a means of ensuring
that economically inefficient transactions are prevented? Does
this explain why the FTC gave the green light to the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger?38 If so, then maybe antitrust law
deserves to be categorized with other protectionist, nontariff
barriers. In my experience, however, this scenario has not
materialized with respect to U.S. antitrust law because of the
professionalism of the federal enforcement agencies and
because politically independent federal judges possess the final
decisionmaking power.
In sum, I believe that more investigation must be made into
both the degree and nature of the harm currently inflicted by
the diversity of antitrust laws around the world. Furthermore,
more attention must be paid to the question whether these
problems would be solved by adopting international
principles. Although a strong case can be made for
international harmonization of various regulatory regimes
(such as the rules for the telecommunications industry, where
state action continues to be a concern), I believe that it has not
been made for the quite different proposition that we need
consistent international rules to regulate private business
behavior.
II. THE REACH OF ANTITRUST REGULATION
I will say much less about this aspect of the panel's topic
because much has already been written.39 Once upon a time,
38. See In re Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., FTC, file no. 971-0051
(July 1, 1997) (statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D.
Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III & Christine A. Vamey) (approving the Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas merger).
39. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, 2 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD §§
21.1-.34 (3d ed. 1997) (providing a helpful introduction to this vast literature).
[Vol. 23
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one could have stated that the United States advocated
"extraterritorial" antitrust regulation, though other countries
abhorred it. Today, the situation is different. Currently, most
major antitrust agencies around the world agree that they have
jurisdiction to combat any practices, anywhere in the world,
that have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
on their domestic markets.40 Some refer to practices that are
being "implemented" within their own markets; some refer to
practices that target their domestic markets. The terminology
does not matter. The key point is that this level of agreement on
the proper scope of national regulation could, if it were
acknowledged everywhere, resolve most competitive problems
of an international scope by using exclusively national
mechanisms.
Here, in a nutshell, is how I see things working out. First,
everyone would agree that national jurisdiction covers both
persons and transactions that are physically within the
country's boundaries as well as transactions that occur outside
their boundaries that have an intended effect within their
countries. Second, countries would agree-on a reciprocal
basis, if necessary-to assist one another in gathering evidence
of suspected antitrust violations. This approach might be
complicated, however, by the facts that a few countries use
private actions extensively, several others recognize them but
do not use them much, and most countries have created a
monopoly of antitrust enforcement in their government
agency. If assistance occurred only in government-to-
government cases, there would be a certain imbalance for the
countries that use private actions. Nonetheless, that would be
an important start, and it is one that the United States tried to
foster when Congress passed the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act in 1994.41 Third, countries would
40. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987).
41. Pub. L. No. 103-438, § 2,108 Stat. 4597 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201- 6212 (1994)).
Under the Act, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the FTC will be
allowed to cooperate with foreign antitrust authorities to obtain investigative
information. Prior to the Act, such disclosures violated the confidentiality provisions in
the Antitrust Civil Process Act, the FTC Act and grand jury secrecy rules. See generally
Antitrust: Clinton Signs Bill to Help Enforcers Obtain Foreign-Located Antitrust
Evidence, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) (Nov. 3, 1994,) (announcing passage and
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agree that mere permission to engage in practices like export
cartels would afford no immunity from another country's
competition laws if the "cartel" has some market power in the
recipient country. Many of these exporting associations are
better described as joint ventures, and many have no power in
the various markets in which they operate. Thus, much of the
debate concerning export cartel exemptions from antitrust law
focuses on a red herring.
Initially, these agreements would be bilateral, but they could,
if the partners agree, expand over time to a regional or
multilateral level. The agreements would need no oversight or
supervision by WTO bureaucracy. They would have the
advantage of allowing countries to choose their dancing
partners with care while avoiding both extravagant promises of
cooperation and gold seals of approval for competition law
regimes that are incompatible with their own.
In this way, the reach of regulation plays an important role
with respect to the issue of federalism with which we began. It
can help solve the problem of effective regulation of
international transactions without binding us to a new world-
wide antitrust bureaucracy. For the practical reasons I
described, it is clearly the most desirable route. Unless someone
makes a compelling empirical case to the contrary, I believe it is
also the best route in the long run. As Karl Meesen once stated,
there is no reason to feel threatened by the competition of
competition laws.42 Finally, we must all hope that if the WTO
chooses to establish a negotiating group on this topic at the end
of this year, serious scholars around the world will explore this
important question in detail and deliver us from the worst
excesses of World Federalism.
outlining provisions of Act).
42. See Karl M. Meessen, An International Antitrust Challenge: Competition of
Competition Laws, 10 J. INT'L L. Bus. 17 (1989).
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